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A couple of criticisms on minor points may be offered. Some of the best authenticated historical examples of feminine inversion receive no mention. And the statement that in bisexual persons, the inverted impulse predominates over the heterosexual, recalls observed instances to the contrary.

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GROUP THEORIES OF RELIGION AND THE RELIGION OF THE INDIVIDUAL. By Clement C. J. Webb. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916. Pp. 208. Price, 5s. net.

In 1914 Mr. Clement Webb delivered a course of lectures at Oxford on certain sociological theories of religion. In their present form they are still lectures. They contain a most interesting commentary for anyone who is reading the works of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl; and they constitute a very able polemic. There was needed just such an attack upon the theories of these men from just such an antagonist as Mr. Webb. It is as a polemic that the book must be read; not as an exposition or a detailed criticism. On the one side we should have ranged all the varieties of contemporary thought represented by Bergson, Sorel, and in philosophy of religion Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Cornford, Harrison; on the other, the Oxford tradition headed by Mr. Webb. Mr. Webb's assault is forceful, but rather scattered. He turns too suddenly from criticism of special theories to criticism of general tendency, and from criticism of M. Lévy-Bruhl to criticism of M. Durkheim, who does not hold quite the same views. And sometimes where he has felt an antipathy he has failed to elaborate a refutation; so that one is left in doubt as to whether he has quite understood M. Durkheim's point of view.

When we examine Mr. Webb's objections one by one, we find that they may be summed up in two classes: one religious, the other philosophical. He objects on religious grounds, because he believes that the tendency of the group theory is to reduce all religion to illusion, to "objectifications of feeling." He objects on philosophical grounds, because the theory of the "social origin of the categories" seems to invalidate *all* human knowledge. These two classes of objection should be kept quite distinct. A theory is hardly likely to be thoroughly positivist

and pragmatist at the same time. So that one is led to a restatement of the positions of both the two sociologists in question.

First M. Lévy-Bruhl. In his book on "Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures" this author distinguishes sharply between a pre-logical and a logical mentality. The former is that of the Bororo of Brazil who has a parrot for his totem. Now, according to M. Lévy-Bruhl, this is not merely the *adoption* of parrot as an heraldic emblem, nor a merely mythological kinship or participation in qualities; nor is the savage *deluded* into thinking that he is a parrot. In practical life, the Bororo never confuses himself with a parrot, nor is he so sophisticated as to think that black is white. But he is capable of a state of mind into which we cannot put ourselves, in which he *is* a parrot, while being at the same time a man. In other words, the mystical mentality, though at a low level, plays a much greater part in the daily life of the savage than in that of the civilised man. M. Lévy-Bruhl goes on to insist quite rightly upon a side of the primitive mind which has been neglected by older anthropologists, such as Frazer, and produces a theory which has much in common with the analyses of mythology recently made by disciples of Freud. It is true that he exaggerates the difference between the mind of the savage and the mind of the civilised man, and that, as Mr. Webb points out, his contrast between "contradiction" and "participation" is misleading. But it is also true that the growth of the scientific spirit has been unfavourable to mysticism, and that mysticism has had an obscurantist effect in science. The contrast is a sound one. Lévy-Bruhl maintains that a sharp differentiation of function is necessary, without abandoning either of two essential attitudes of the human mind. This is the "empiricism" to which Mr. Webb objects. His objection is, at bottom, the objection of the theologian—neither mystic nor scientist. It is the struggle between the theologian and the mystic, rather than that between the believer in religion and the scientist, which is here represented.

When Mr. Webb turns to deal with Durkheim, he confuses genuine issues with misinterpretation. He is at his best in picking to pieces M. Durkheim's "definition" of religion. People who are tempted to define religion should read Chapter III. In criticising the theory of "collective representations" he is not so felicitous. Not that there is not much to be said against this theory. M. Durkheim talks far too much about

“society”; everything is ascribed to its influence. And Mr. Webb has our sympathy in his stand for the rights of “individual” religion, though we may not sympathise with his demand for the personality of God or with his demand for individual immortality. But his statement that “for sociologists religion, because it is a ‘collective representation,’ misrepresents the world” is quite unfair to the author in question. According to Durkheim (in the conclusion to his “Elementary Forms of the Religious Life”) science is no more “individual” than religion. Its faith does not differ essentially from religious faith (p. 458, English trans.). “In all social life, in fact, science rests upon opinion.” The function of religion is to help us to live and act, the believer is *stronger* than the unbeliever. The view of both religion and science is pragmatic. We wish that Mr. Webb had attacked on this issue. Whoever wishes to understand just what the issue is should read Mr. Webb’s last two chapters, then M. Durkheim’s last chapter. Then he ought to realise that the struggle of “liberal” against “orthodox” faith is out of date. The present conflict is far more momentous than that.

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A MODERN JOB: an Essay on the Problem of Evil. By Étienne Giran. Translated by Fred Rothwell. With an Introduction by Archdeacon Lilley. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1916. Pp. 92. Price, \$0.75, or 2s. 6d. net.

The Open Court Publishing Company is to be congratulated on issuing this small volume at such an opportune moment. The colossal struggle through which we are passing is turning the attention of large numbers of thoughtful people to some of the fundamental problems of religion. Amongst these problems probably the most important as well as the most difficult are the problem of God and the problem of evil. As Canon Lilley in a short introduction says: “M. Giran, with a fine insight, has followed the indications of the Biblical story, but has followed them with the chastened reserve of one who would be sincere with himself and with the anguish of troubled souls in our own doubtful day.”

The main idea in the book is that Religion must become a